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Inspection of Embassy Djibouti, Djibouti

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS



OIG HIGHLIGHTS

ISP-I-18-14

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OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS
Bureau of African Affairs

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What OIG Found

- Under the Charge' d'Affaires' leadership, Embassy Djibouti effectively supported its top Integrated Country Strategy goal by advancing the long-term viability and maximum operational flexibility of the U.S. military presence in the Republic of Djibouti.
- Chronic staffing vacancies hampered mission performance.
- OIG identified multiple internal control deficiencies in Management, Consular, Public Diplomacy, Political-Economic, and Information Management operations.
- The Department of State had not added a section chief position to the Political-Economic Section to ensure the section's effectiveness in support of the Integrated Country Strategy.
- Embassy Djibouti did not have an Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator position in the Consular Section, leaving it vulnerable to a security risk for consular fraud.
- Despite Djibouti being at high risk for earthquakes, the embassy had not addressed findings from the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations' 2014 Seismic Report, and it had not performed seismic safety assessments of any subsequently leased residential properties.
- Spotlight on Success: Collaborative coordination mechanisms established between Embassy Djibouti and the U.S. military stationed at nearby Camp Lemonnier effectively advanced U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa.

What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected Embassy Djibouti's executive direction, program and policy implementation, resource management, and management controls.

What OIG Recommended

This report includes 25 recommendations. OIG made 22 recommendations to Embassy Djibouti to improve Management, Consular, Public Diplomacy, Political-Economic and Information Management operations. OIG also made 1 recommendation to the Bureau of African Affairs regarding staffing; 1 to the Bureau of Consular Affairs on position reclassification; and 1 to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations regarding seismic safety.

In its comments on the draft report, the Department concurred with all 25 recommendations. OIG considers the recommendations resolved. The Department's response to each recommendation, and OIG's reply, can be found in the Recommendations section of this report. The Department's formal written responses are reprinted in their entirety in Appendix B.

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CONTEXT

The Republic of Djibouti, a desert country roughly the size of New Hampshire at 8,500 square miles, sits strategically at the mouth of the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa. It overlooks one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, with products moving through the Bab-al-Mandeb strait, up through the Gulf of Aden toward the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean, and beyond.

Djibouti shares borders with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, and is a short boat ride from Yemen. It was created from the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas in 1977. Ismail Omar Guelleh, who began his fourth term as president in 2016, first was elected 1999.

Half of Djibouti's 800,000 people live on less than two dollars a day, and its economy is heavily dependent on port services and rents from foreign countries' military bases. Djibouti hosts the only major U.S. military installation in Africa, Camp Lemonnier, which serves as the headquarters of the Combined Joint Taskforce Horn of Africa. The camp is home to approximately 4,500 military personnel and contractors. Other nations also appreciate Djibouti's strategic value. The Republic of Djibouti Government maintains longstanding ties to France, which has a significant military presence in the country. Russia has an active embassy, and China opened a naval facility, the first of its kind outside of China, in August 2017. At the time of the inspection, Djibouti was the only country in the world hosting both U.S. and Chinese military. China also is heavily invested in Djibouti's largest infrastructure projects, including a rehabilitated rail link between Ethiopia and Djibouti.

The embassy's December 2016 Integrated Country Strategy's (ICS) top priority is ensuring the long-term viability and maximum operational flexibility of the U.S. military presence. Other key ICS goals are advancing Djibouti's economic and human development and supporting Djibouti's democratic development and stability. The United States contributed \$19 million in foreign assistance to Djibouti in FY 2016. This amount included funding for military assistance and for development assistance for health, education, and social service programs.

At the time of the inspection, Embassy Djibouti was authorized 51 U.S. direct-hire personnel and 8 eligible family member positions, of which 7 were vacant. The embassy was also authorized 371 locally employed (LE) staff members. Other mission agencies include the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense. The mission moved into a new embassy compound in 2011. A new chief of mission residence will be built on the site of the former chancery, although, at the time of the inspection a pre-construction meeting had yet to be scheduled. The embassy's operating budget in FY 2016 was \$19,962,795.

OIG evaluated the embassy's policy implementation, resource management, and management controls consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act.¹ A companion classified report contains a comprehensive discussion of the conduct of the security program and issues affecting the safety of mission personnel and facilities.

¹ See Appendix A.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

OIG assessed Embassy Djibouti's leadership on the basis of 35 interviews that included comments on Front Office performance; 124 staff questionnaires; and OIG's review of documents and observations of meetings and activities during the course of the on-site inspection.

Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct

Embassy Djibouti's Front Office experienced considerable turnover during the first 9 months of 2017. The previous Ambassador departed post in January 2017.² The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) departed post in June 2017. Her replacement arrived in May 2017 and had been serving as Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim (CDA) since the DCM's departure. At the time of the on-site portion of the inspection, a new Ambassador was expected to arrive in Djibouti early in 2018. The Management Officer, who arrived in August 2017, also served as the acting DCM. In the short time the CDA had been at post, he set a positive and professional tone for the embassy, consistent with Department leadership principles in 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 1214. American and LE staff consistently told OIG in interviews and surveys that the CDA exhibited integrity and decisiveness as well as strong communication and collaboration skills. He valued differing points of view, and staff widely praised his accessibility.

OIG found that the CDA's leadership characteristics contributed to advancing the mission's ICS goals. Several section chiefs commented to OIG on the CDA's pragmatism and willingness to collaborate to achieve mission priorities. Examples included intervention with the Minister of Health to initiate a priority USAID project; interaction with the Defense Attaché to identify alternative funding for support of the Djiboutian Armed Forces; expansion of embassy information sharing with the Djiboutian Armed Forces; and promotion of a U.S. private sector investment and export project with the Minister of Investment. The CDA also actively and creatively addressed long-standing internal embassy issues, such as identifying a new location for the alternate command center,³ as discussed in the companion classified report.

The CDA demonstrated a commitment to integrity and ethical values. He issued guidance to the embassy community on working hours, records management, and internal internet policies shortly after his arrival. At his instruction, the Front Office's Office Management Specialist maintained a gift registry per 2 FAM 964.

Equal Employment Opportunity Program Met Department Standards

The embassy's Equal Employment Opportunity program met the requirements of 3 FAM 1500. The embassy posted Equal Employment Opportunity notices and references in multiple

² A retired ambassador served as Charge' d'Affaires from February through April 2017.

³ According to 12 Foreign Affairs Handbook-1 H-261, a command center is a hub of information exchange to monitor a situation and formulate responses. The handbook requires establishment of a second, or alternate, command center. The alternate command center should be physically separated from the first in the event the two locations are cut off.

locations. The CDA and acting DCM scheduled quarterly meetings with the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor, who told OIG she had good access to the CDA. The embassy also had two LE Equal Employment Opportunity liaisons. The counselor recently received training and, in turn, briefed U.S. supervisors and LE staff on what she learned and how they could apply that information to their work. OIG interviews found that American and LE staff knew who the counselor and liaisons were and understood the procedures available.

Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

Embassy Djibouti prepared its most recent ICS in 2016 and included input from all embassy sections, as well as from the country team at an off-site strategy and planning conference. In December 2016, the Department approved the ICS, which covered the period 2017 through 2020.

The CDA effectively supported the United States' overarching ICS priority of ensuring the long-term viability and maximum operational flexibility of Camp Lemonnier. The CDA communicated almost daily with Camp Lemonnier officials, and the embassy country team included several camp representatives. The CDA and camp leaders jointly hosted biweekly meetings with the Defense Attaché Office, Office of Security Cooperation, Regional Security Office, Office of Regional Affairs, and Political-Economic Section. At these meetings, the group discusses issues and activities related to Camp Lemonnier. The CDA held a monthly briefing on embassy responsibilities and operations for all new camp arrivals. In interviews with OIG, Camp Lemonnier leadership spoke positively of the relationship with the embassy and the CDA.

The CDA participated in biweekly calls with the East Africa Office of the Bureau of African Affairs to review embassy and Department priorities. He also took part in regular conference calls with the bureau's Acting Assistant Secretary and other bureau chiefs of mission. In addition, he reviewed military foreign assistance issues with the Defense Attaché Office on a weekly basis. The CDA relied on the appropriate embassy sections to oversee other embassy-managed foreign assistance programs, and important issues were brought to his attention in weekly Political-Military meetings.

Adherence to Internal Controls

The embassy prepared its FY 2017 Annual Chief of Mission Management Control Statement of Assurance in accordance with 2 FAM 024. The former Management Officer coordinated the process, which the subsequent Management Officer reviewed upon her arrival. In accordance with 2 FAM 022.7, the CDA reviewed the submission with the Management Officer prior to submitting it on September 15, 2017.

Key Vacancies Cited as a Significant Deficiency

The embassy's Statement of Assurance identified chronic vacancies as a significant deficiency. Critical Management Section positions had been vacant for 4 years prior to the inspection, and OIG found that these vacancies contributed to the deficiencies described in the Resource Management section of this report. Persistent staffing vacancies also hampered operations in

the Political-Economic and Consular Sections. The embassy did not identify any other material weaknesses or significant deficiencies and reported that the embassy completed all required internal management control reviews. However, OIG identified significant internal control deficiencies in the General Services and Human Resource Offices. The CDA and acting DCM told OIG they would strengthen their oversight. OIG also advised them to consult with the bureau about internal control deficiencies identified in this report to determine if the Statement of Assurance should be amended.

The CDA complied with 9 FAM 403.9-2(D)e and 9 FAM 403.10-3(D)(1) requirements to review the Consular Section chief's visa adjudications, meeting 100 percent of the required standard from June through October 2017.

Security of the Mission

The CDA conducted his security responsibilities in accordance with 2 FAM 112 and 2 FAM 113. He met with the Regional Security Officer weekly, and both attended frequent security-related meetings with Camp Lemonnier officials. Embassy and camp security personnel also conducted joint emergency drills. With the CDA's support, the Regional Security Officer, who arrived in August 2017, intended to expand embassy security drills to include joint exercises with the local guard force and the Marine Security Guard detachment. The CDA told OIG he considered the 2011 Chief of Mission-Combatant Command Memorandum of Agreement on Security and Force Protection adequate. However, OIG suggested that it be reviewed and updated, if appropriate, once the new Ambassador arrived at post and the pending restructuring of Camp Lemonnier's command was finalized.

The CDA chaired the Emergency Action Committee, which is responsible for embassy emergency preparedness. The companion classified inspection report discusses emergency preparedness issues in further detail.

Developing and Mentoring Future Foreign Service Leaders

The CDA counseled and mentored the embassy's seven First- and Second-Tour (FAST) employees in accordance with 3 FAM 2242.4 and Department guidelines. He oversaw and hosted monthly development sessions that addressed topics of broad interest to all FAST employees, such as the role of the Political Advisor at Camp Lemonnier and how to write effective emails. He also had met individually with each FAST employee to address their interests and priorities at least once since his arrival in June 2017. The employees commented favorably to OIG on the CDA's openness, interest, and commitment to FAST issues and said they appreciated the opportunity to work with him on a frequent basis.

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Political-Economic Section

OIG reviewed the Political-Economic Section's policy implementation, reporting and advocacy, commercial promotion, Leahy vetting,⁴ and grants management. OIG also reviewed the embassy's foreign assistance planning and coordination and program management of Department of State (Department) funded foreign assistance programs. These include programs to assist refugees and vulnerable migrants and combat trafficking in persons, administered by the Political-Economic Section; programs to counter violent extremism, administered by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations; and programs to train police and improve border security, administered by the Regional Security Office. OIG found that the section's operations generally conformed to Department requirements. However, as discussed below, the section's staffing structure impeded the embassy's ability to deliver reporting that met the needs of Washington interlocutors. In addition, OIG found that the section was not following grant closeout procedures, although the embassy took corrective action to address this deficiency during the course of the inspection.

Political-Economic Section Worked to Fulfill Integrated Country Strategy Goals

The Political-Economic Section worked to advance ICS goals through its advocacy efforts. The section's effective advocacy and broad range of contacts contributed to the Djiboutian Government joining the coalition to defeat ISIS, passing new laws to assist refugees, and taking substantive steps to combat trafficking in persons in the year prior to this inspection. Section staff dedicated substantial time to the embassy's primary ICS goal of helping maintain Djiboutian Government support for Camp Lemonnier and its regional operations by engaging on top Djiboutian Government priorities, such as local employment at the base. During the inspection, the section was instrumental in obtaining clearance for a senior U.S. military officer whose contract aircraft initially was denied permission to depart by Djibouti's civil aviation authority.

Political-Economic Section Staffing Structure Impeded Meeting Policymakers' Needs

Department officials and other agency representatives told OIG that embassy reporting in 2016-2017 did not meet Washington policymakers' needs because it did not sufficiently address internal political issues and lacked detailed analysis and regional context. OIG found that the Political-Economic Section's staffing structure impeded the embassy's ability to produce reporting that met Washington's needs. The section had a total of six employees: one FAST Political Officer and one FAST Economic Officer, both of whom reported directly to the Front Office; one eligible family member; and three LE staff positions. However, the section overall lacked experienced reporting officers, and section staff spent much of their time handling the

⁴ The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the Department of State from furnishing assistance to foreign security forces if the Department receives credible information that such forces have committed gross violations of human rights. See 22 USC 2378d.

heavy visitor load. In the 12 months prior to the inspection, the section hosted 34 official visitors and briefed more than 40 high-level military officials.

In its 2017 and 2018 Mission Resource Requests, the embassy stated that it needed more senior officers experienced in dealing with complex bilateral issues. It also requested the addition of a mid-level section chief because of Djibouti's growing importance to U.S. humanitarian and military operations and heavy official visitor workload. However, the Bureau of African Affairs did not act on the section chief request due to limited resources to fund new positions and competing requests for new positions among its posts. Guidance in 3 FAM 2614c requires that positions be structured and staffed in the most economic manner consistent with effective mission accomplishment. The current office staffing structure does not comply with this standard, as the existing structure creates the risk that policymakers would lack sufficient information on which to base policy decisions.

Recommendation 1: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti, should restructure the staffing of the Political-Economic Section to more effectively support the embassy's Integrated Country Strategy goals (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti)

Political-Economic Section Did Not Follow Grant Closeout Procedures

The Political-Economic Section did not follow grant closeout procedures for the embassy's FY 2016 Special Self-Help and Julia Taft Fund grants,⁵ as required in the Department's January 2016 Federal Assistance Policy Directive. Section 3.07 requires managers of all Federal assistance awards to complete the closeout process no later than 1 year after receipt of all required final reports. OIG reviewed all nine FY 2016 and one FY 2017 Special Self-Help, Julia Taft, and U.S. Africa Development Foundation grants, totaling \$135,000. Although the funds had been expended, none of the grant files had all the required closeout documents, such as final program reports, closeout letters, and grants officer assessments. OIG found that the Political-Economic Section's warranted Grants Officer and certified Grants Officer Representative were unfamiliar with the provisions of the Federal Assistance Policy Directive and lacked a standard operating procedures manual for grants management.

Without obtaining final reports, the embassy cannot evaluate whether the grants achieved the desired outcomes or determine whether U.S. Government funds were spent in accordance with the grant terms. OIG advised section employees on federal assistance policy requirements, including proper closeout of grants, and the section brought the FY 2016 Self Help and Julia Taft grants and the FY 2017 Julia Taft grant into compliance with Department policies. As a result, OIG did not make a recommendation in this report.

⁵ Special Self-Help grants fund small-scale projects that are initiated and administered by the local community. Julia Taft grants fund small-scale projects that assist refugees, internally displaced persons, or vulnerable migrants.

Leahy Vetting Conducted in Accordance with Department Requirements

In the 12 months prior to the inspection, Embassy Djibouti handled 258 Leahy vetting cases for potential gross human rights abuses in accordance with applicable laws and Department requirements. The political officer coordinated the Leahy process, and the two largest nominators of individuals and security units—the Office of Security Cooperation and the Regional Security Office—each had designated and trained Leahy vetting coordinators.

Federal Assistance

OIG found well-coordinated mission-wide planning and program implementation of Department-funded security assistance between embassy agencies and Camp Lemonnier's U.S. military components. Programming supported the embassy's ICS goals.

Spotlight on Success: Civil-Military Coordination Furthered U.S. Interests

Embassy Djibouti and Camp Lemonnier established collaborative coordination mechanisms that facilitated planning and implementation of activities to effectively advance U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa. At a monthly "3D" meeting, Department of State, Department of Defense, and USAID personnel discussed diplomacy, defense, and development issues of common concern. The meeting provided an effective forum for strategic and tactical planning and implementation. For example, the Combined Joint Taskforce Horn of Africa constructed hospitals and libraries throughout the Republic of Djibouti as part of its humanitarian civic assistance program. USAID structured its programming to provide library books and conduct youth reading programs in these facilities. Using local contacts and introductions in the project areas, the embassy then was able to organize a field research project on countering violent extremism.

Public Diplomacy

OIG reviewed the Public Affairs Section's (PAS) strategic planning, reporting, knowledge management, section leadership, cultural programs, and alumni outreach. The section used an appropriate range of tools and programs to advance ICS goals, with an emphasis on countering and preventing violent extremism, English language instruction, and entrepreneurship. The section also supported Camp Lemonnier's public affairs efforts and had effective working relationships with U.S. military counterparts at Camp Lemonnier. OIG found the Public Affairs Officer responsibly managed resources and promoted collaboration across the mission and that section operations generally were in compliance with Department standards. However, OIG identified deficiencies in media engagement, American Spaces management, and grants administration, as discussed below.

Embassy Had Not Updated Mission Media Policy

OIG found that Embassy Djibouti last updated its internal media policy, which establishes standard operating procedures for engaging journalists, in August 2011. According to the Department's Public Affairs Officer Handbook, Working with the Media, Public Affairs Officers should establish and distribute such a policy upon arrival in country to ensure coordination in

managing media relations. Failure to regularly circulate updated guidelines can compromise the mission's emergency preparedness as well as consistency in public messaging. OIG did, in fact, identify examples of such inconsistency. Specifically, there had been two recent instances of local media engagements scheduled without prior consultation with the Public Affairs Officer. OIG advised the Public Affairs Officer to prepare an updated internal mission media policy. The Public Affairs Officer did so and disseminated the document to all mission personnel in October 2017.

Section Lacked Social Media Strategy

PAS did not have a social media strategy, as prescribed by the Department's guidance to overseas missions.⁶ Due to competing priorities, the section had begun to draft but had not finalized such a strategy. PAS used several social media platforms to engage local audiences; the embassy's Twitter account ranked first in terms of followers in Djibouti and its Facebook page ranked second. However, without a strategy to engage the public using social media, the section lacked a framework to ensure content was linked to mission objectives and delivered a measurable return on the embassy's investment of time and resources. OIG provided guidance, templates, and samples of social media strategies used by other U.S. missions to PAS personnel.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs, should implement a social media strategy. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with AF and IIP)

Information Resource Center Had No Annual Plan

OIG's inspection of the Information Resource Center, an American Space⁷ located on the embassy compound, determined that it met applicable requirements, with one exception. The center lacked an annual plan for resource development and programming, as required by the Bureau of International Information Programs' Standards for American Spaces. OIG found that section personnel were unaware of this requirement. The lack of an annual plan increased the risk that an American Space would host or organize activities inconsistent with mission priorities.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, should implement an annual resource development and programming plan for its American Space. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with IIP)

⁶ Cable 2013 State 144456, "Social Media Strategy Framework for Overseas Missions," October 18, 2013.

⁷ American Spaces are Department-operated or -supported public diplomacy facilities that host programs and use digital tools to engage foreign audiences in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. They conduct five core programs: English language learning, educational advising, engaging alumni of U.S. Government-sponsored exchange programs, community outreach, and providing access to information about the United States.

Inconsistent Use of Risk Assessments and Monitoring Plans

OIG reviewed all six of the section's FY 2016 and FY 2017 grants (totaling \$162,623) and found that five lacked risk assessments and monitoring plans.⁸ Sections 2.03-A and 3.01-A of the Federal Assistance Policy Directive and Sections K and O in Chapter 2 of the Federal Assistance Directive mandate these internal controls for all grants.⁹ The Department requires incorporation of a risk assessment into each monitoring plan; that monitoring plan should moreover include a risk mitigation strategy and identify tools to measure the recipient's progress in meeting the grant's goals and objectives. PAS personnel mistakenly believed that grants under \$10,000—which do not require approval from the Bureau of African Affairs Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs—were not subject to this requirement. Failure to conduct a risk assessment and prepare a monitoring plan may result in loss or misuse of award funds as well as the inability to determine whether the grant is being carried out in the best interests of the U.S. Government.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should prepare risk assessments and monitoring plans for all Public Affairs Section grants. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with A)

Consular Affairs

The workload for Embassy Djibouti's Consular Section fluctuated considerably from FY 2014 through FY 2017 due to the 2015 closure of Embassy Sanaa, Yemen. The Department designated Embassy Djibouti as the processing post for Yemeni immigrant visa applicants because of the physical proximity of Yemen and Djibouti and because Djibouti was among the few nations that allowed Yemenis to enter the country to apply for consular services. The Consular Section coordinated its visa appointments with the Djiboutian Government in order for Yemenis to receive Djiboutian visas. The number of immigrant visas issued by Embassy Djibouti—103 in FY 2014—increased to 2,089 in FY 2015 and 8,117 in FY 2016 before dropping to 4,140 in FY 2017.

OIG reviewed all consular operations, including immigrant and nonimmigrant visa and American citizens services. OIG found that the Consular Section generally met Department standards. However, OIG identified deficiencies in consular staffing, resource management, and fraud prevention, as detailed below. In some cases, the embassy already had initiated steps to resolve the deficiencies and was seeking Department support for its efforts.

⁸ OIG previously identified a global pattern of this deficiency in its *Management Assistance Report: Improved Oversight Needed to Standardize the Use of Risk Assessments and Monitoring Plans for Overseas Grants* (ISP-17-33, July 2017).

⁹ Three grants reviewed by OIG were subject to the Department's Federal Assistance Policy Directive (issued March 2015, revised January 2016) and the Procedural Guide for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to Non-Federal Entities Not Recognized as Foreign Public Entities (issued December 2015). On May 20, 2017, the Office of the Procurement Executive consolidated these two documents into a Federal Assistance Directive (revised October 1, 2017). The other three grants were subject to this revised, consolidated guidance.

Consular Section Chief Provided Strong Leadership

OIG found that the Consular Section chief provided strong leadership and resource management in the face of a heavy workload and complex requirements. When the Consular Section assumed Embassy Sanaa's immigrant visa workload in April 2015, it included a backlog of 8,000 cases. The consular staff, with the help of dozens of temporary duty personnel, reduced that backlog to 1,000 cases by October 2017. Embassy Djibouti had to reconstruct many of those cases electronically, as Embassy Sanaa destroyed the paper files before closing the embassy. The 2017 Executive Orders and Presidential Proclamations restricting travel to the U.S. also affected Embassy Djibouti: these orders and proclamations each included Yemen and Somalia, and the vast majority of Embassy Djibouti's visa applicants were from these nations. In addition, new requirements for all posts to institute enhanced vetting of visa applicants led to more security advisory opinions¹⁰ and DNA testing. Embassy Djibouti managed this increased workload notwithstanding staffing challenges. In particular, one of the four consular officer positions had been vacant since the Department created the position in 2016, and the section could not hire more eligible family members due to the Department's hiring freeze.¹¹ OIG found that the section chief matched workload with resources in response to these issues.

Fraud Prevention Program

Lack of an Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator contributed to Consular Fraud Risk

The Consular Section did not have an Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator (ARSO-I)¹² position. According to 7 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-942.8(a), an ARSO-I's primary purpose is "to conduct criminal investigations related to passport and visa fraud." Before being closed, Embassy Sanaa had two ARSO-I positions. Embassy Djibouti requested approval for an ARSO-I position in February 2016, citing evidence that the potential for visa fraud had increased because criminals had moved from Sanaa to Djibouti to sell forged documents to Yemenis applying for visas. The embassy also noted that Republic of Djibouti is a transit country for human trafficking from Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

The Bureau of Consular Affairs supported the creation of a new ARSO-I position in Djibouti, but, due to the hiring freeze, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security had not approved the position at the

¹⁰ Security advisory opinions are requests sent by an embassy to the Department to coordinate interagency checks on visa applicants about whom there is a security-related concern.

¹¹ A government-wide hiring freeze was first announced by the Office of Management in Budget on January 23, 2017. While most positions were frozen and could not be filled if vacant, the Secretary approved specific exemptions to the hiring freeze to ensure the Department was able to meet critical needs. During the inspection, the Secretary announced that beginning in January 2018, he would give greater authority to the bureaus to strategically manage the exemption process and fill vacant positions through lateral reassignments and internal promotions. In addition, he stated he would authorize each of the regional bureaus to fill 1,500 priority eligible family member positions abroad in FY 2018, to meet the Department's security, health, and safety requirements.

¹² According to 7 FAH-1 H-942.8, the ARSO-I program is a joint venture of the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security to enhance U.S. border security by establishing investigative positions at selected overseas posts.

time of the inspection. Leaving the embassy without an ARSO-I position perpetuates a security risk for consular fraud.

Consular Management

Grade Levels of Consular Officer Positions Did Not Meet Department Criteria

The grade levels for two of the four consular officer positions at Embassy Djibouti were inconsistent with the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Approved Overseas Consular Staffing Models and the Bureau of Human Resources' Position Classification Criteria for Consular Officers, both of which were issued in May 2010. The section had an FS-03 mid-level section chief and three FAST officer positions, but Department criteria state that a four-officer consular section should have an FS-02 section chief, an FS-03 deputy section chief, and two FAST officer positions. Incorrectly graded positions create a management control vulnerability, especially in a high-volume consular operation with a high risk of fraud, such as Embassy Djibouti's.

This problem occurred because the section quickly increased from two to four officer positions in 2016, to handle the increased workload resulting from Embassy Djibouti being named as the processing post for Yemeni immigrant visa applicants. The Bureau of Consular Affairs told OIG that it had been prepared to re-grade the positions in 2017 to conform to its criteria, but the Department froze all such changes during its "redesign." In addition, an untenured FAST officer assumed Accountable Consular Officer responsibilities when the section chief was away, although 7 FAH-1 H-632(d) states that "officers designated as Accountable Consular Officers should be experienced, tenured consular officers."

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should reclassify the grade levels of the Consular Section chief position and one of the First- and Second-Tour consular officer positions in Embassy Djibouti. (Action: CA, in coordination with DGHR)

Consular Section Unable to Keep Up with Correspondence

The Consular Section was unable to meet its requirements to provide timely, complete, and accurate responses to the approximately 75 to 100 emails (primarily regarding immigrant visas and Consular Reports of Birth Abroad) and 7 to 10 Congressional inquiries received daily. The staff attempted to prioritize this workload by answering all Congressional inquiries within 2 working days and assessed the other emails to try to identify the most urgent inquiries. The section relied on inadequate automatic responses for the remaining inquiries, even though each inquiry merited research and individualized replies. Moreover, in allocating work, the section chief gave visa correspondence a lower priority than other tasks. He told OIG he planned to request a second eligible family member to assist the existing Consular Associate with correspondence, security advisory opinions, and DNA testing, the latter of which must be monitored by a cleared American.

Notwithstanding the Consular Section's efforts to manage its workload, these practices do not comply with Department standards. Guidance in 9 FAM 601.7 states that replies to visa

correspondence should be complete and accurate, and 7 FAH-1 H-441(a) states that inefficient correspondence “wastes time, causes delays, frays nerves, projects a poor public image, and creates more work by leaving questions unanswered, thus generating yet more work.” OIG supports the pending embassy request to the Bureau of Consular Affairs for a Consular Associate eligible family member position.

Space Management

Consular Work Space Was Inadequate and Poorly Configured

The Consular Section work space was inadequate and poorly configured. When the Department designed Embassy Djibouti, the consular workload was considerably less than in 2017. By the time of the inspection, though, the section lacked sufficient interview windows for the increased workload, so employees used the consular cashier booth for interviews. Employees also used the booth for document storage because of a lack of file space. Both actions are inconsistent with the intent of 7 FAH-1 H-742a., which requires the Accountable Consular Officer to limit access to the consular cashier booth as a basic management control. Anticipated staffing increases, including the addition of an ARSO-I position, would require the expansion of the consular work space. Finally, the Consular Section chief’s office lacked line of sight to most of the LE staff.

According to 7 FAH-1 H-281(a), “[a]n effective consular section needs to provide secure, adequate, efficient, comfortable, and attractive accommodation for both visitors and staff” and delineates factors consular managers should use in evaluating their space needs, including sufficient interview windows and line-of-sight supervision. Failure to resolve these space issues hinders the ability of the Consular Section to provide efficient and timely services while maintaining adequate management controls.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should renovate the Consular Section to expand consular processing capabilities, improve management controls, and accommodate anticipated increased staffing. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with CA and OBO)

Line of Sight Hampered by Separated Work Stations for American and LE Staff

The work stations for American employees were located on one side of the Consular Section rather than being interspersed among those of the LE staff. According to 7 FAH-1 H-281(e), the “work stations and offices for adjudicating officers should be located throughout the section to provide the greatest possible range of overlapping lines of sight.” During the inspection, the Consular Section chief reorganized work stations so that American officers were co-located with the LE staff.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

OIG reviewed Embassy Djibouti’s General Services, Human Resources, Financial Management, and Facility Management operations. OIG found that vacancies and staffing gaps across the

Management Section, especially in the General Services and Human Resources Offices, hindered the section's ability to meet internal control requirements. For example, the Department established the human resource officer and assistant general service officer positions in 2013 as "First In-Cone" positions,¹³ but neither had ever been filled. Two of four management positions—community liaison officer and housing assistant—were vacant for at least 6 months before this inspection. Upon her arrival in August 2017, the new Management Officer not only became the acting DCM but assumed the Human Resource Officer, Post Occupational Safety and Health Officer, and Community Liaison Officer duties.

As a result of the vacancies and staffing gaps, OIG identified significant internal control deficiencies within the General Services and Human Resource Offices. In addition, OIG found that the Financial Management and Facility Management Offices, while generally operating in accordance with applicable laws and Department guidance, also had deficiencies that needed to be addressed.

General Services

Property Management Program Did Not Comply with Department Standards

OIG identified multiple areas that did not comply with personal property management guidance in 14 FAM 410 and 14 FAH-1.

- The embassy warehouse lacked sufficient controls to prevent unauthorized personnel from accessing the storage and receiving areas. Guidance in 14 FAH-1 H-313.7-1 and 14 FAH-1 H-313.7-2 requires controls and procedures to prevent and detect unauthorized entry and control authorized entry.
- Property records did not include repair and maintenance data. According to 14 FAM 412.4-1b(1), the Accountable Property Manager must ensure that a system is established to document requests for repair of personal property and to capture data necessary for updating maintenance records.
- The Facilities Management storekeeper duties included both purchasing and receiving personal property. Guidance in 14 FAM 411.2(d) states that a sound management control system must ensure that no one individual is in the position to control all aspects of any transaction that affects the receipt, storage, or disposition of expendable and non-expendable personal property.
- The Facilities Management storekeeper tracked inventory with a paper log rather than the mandatory automated system. Guidance in 14 FAM 414.2-1 requires the use of approved property accountability systems, including the Integrated Logistics Management Systems Asset Management application and the Integrated Logistics Management System Expendable Management System.

¹³ Cable 2015 State 114364, "DG Highlights Fall Edition," October 1, 2015. This cable announced the First In-Cone Assignment pilot program to ensure that FS-03 and FS-04 Foreign Service officers without previous assignments in their chosen field (cone) could gain proficiency in those areas. The Bureau of Human Resources created 80 such positions worldwide.

- Expendable and non-expendable property levels had high percentages of excess stock. Guidance in 14 FAH-1 H 419.2 includes instructions for determining and maintaining inventory stock levels.
- The Accountable Property Officer did not properly conduct or record inventory spot checks. According to 14 FAM 411.2-2(c), the officer must personally conduct periodic, unannounced spot counts of expendable and non-expendable in warehouses to verify the accuracy of inventory records. In addition, 14 FAH-1 H 611d explains that these spot counts must be performed at least semi-annually.
- Section officials did not provide proper oversight of auctions and property disposals. Standards in 14 FAM 411.2-3(b) require that the Property Disposal Officer witness key disposal activities and ensure that proper disposal-related entries are made on the correct forms.

Staffing gaps in GSO, other priorities, and a lack of LE staff training contributed to these property control weaknesses. The failure to identify and correct deficiencies weakens internal controls and places the U.S. Government at greater risk of waste, fraud, or mismanagement of property resources.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration and the Bureau of African Affairs, should bring the embassy's property program into full compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with A and AF)

Residential Fuel Program Did Not Meet Department Standards

The General Services Office did not properly oversee its annual \$26,629 residential fuel program for generators. OIG found no documented spot checks of fuel deliveries or evidence that residential fuel tanks were calibrated or locked. The Accountable Property Officer did not designate a receiving clerk to check that deliveries matched the amount of fuel dispensed from the embassy tank.

Guidance in 14 FAH-1 H-815.4 details the requirements for staff to inspect, calibrate, and secure pumps and tanks. Embassy management was unaware of these oversight requirements. According to 14 FAH 815.2(d), copies of orders for fuel deliveries must be forwarded to the receiving clerk and acquisition documents should be compared with vendor delivery tickets to ensure that the correct quantity of fuel is delivered. Although the embassy ordered automated measuring devices for its residential fuel tanks and used a fuel truck that could be calibrated to record the fuel being dispensed, it had still not established a system to adequately receive and charge for fuel deliveries. The lack of a comprehensive monitoring program increases the risk of fuel theft and inaccurate fuel charges.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Djibouti should implement a comprehensive residential fuel delivery program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Embassy Drivers Worked Excessive Shifts

Drivers throughout the mission exceeded limits on working hours in FY 2017, including three drivers who worked 17 hour shifts and another driver who worked multiple 16 hour shifts. The Department's Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program, 14 FAM 432.4c(3), 15 FAM 957.3(4), and the mission's motor pool operations policy prohibit drivers from exceeding 10 hours of duty each day. Multiple factors contributed to the excessive shift lengths, including position vacancies and the failure to assign alternate drivers to cover lengthy out-of-town trips. Failure to limit vehicle operator duty hours increased the risk of driver fatigue and preventable motor vehicle accidents.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Djibouti should comply with the Department's Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program policy on vehicle operator duty limits. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Embassy Vehicle Policy Did Not Comply with Department Standards

OIG found that Embassy Djibouti's vehicle policy did not comply with Department standards. For example, the embassy did not charge temporary duty employees for non-official use of motor pool vehicles as required in 14 FAM 433.3-4(3). In addition, "other authorized use" of U.S. Government vehicles and the use of armored vehicles did not follow guidance in 14 FAM 433.4 and 14 FAM 433.2, respectively. Finally, the vehicle policy itself did not address the use of the embassy's official boats, which OIG found were owned and operated by mission agencies. While the Department has no guidance regarding the use of boats for official purposes, OIG concludes that this is an issue that should be specifically addressed given the life and safety risks that could exist when employees use this type of transportation. Without a vehicle policy that complies with Department standards, the embassy is at risk of its Government vehicles being misused.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Djibouti should update its vehicle policy to be compliant with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti).

Medical and Safe Driver Training Certifications Out of Date or Missing

Embassy Djibouti's Motor Vehicle Accountable Officer failed to ensure that only properly trained and medically cleared drivers operated official vehicles. OIG found that 53 of the 106 chauffeurs and incidental drivers had either expired medical exams or no expiration date was identified for their medical exam. Seven drivers had no record of attending safe driver training. Insufficient oversight, including a lack of accountability and the lack of a standard operating procedure, contributed to this deficiency.

As stated in 14 FAM 432.4c, posts that employ chauffeurs or authorize incidental operators to self-drive official vehicles must implement the Department's Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program. All U.S. Government agencies under chief of mission authority also must comply with these requirements. Inadequate oversight of medical and safe driver training requirements increases the risk of vehicle accidents and personal injury as well as the Department's liability.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Djibouti should require all mission drivers to comply with the Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Embassy Mechanics Performed Repairs on Personal Vehicles for U.S. Direct-Hire Employees

OIG found that Embassy Djibouti's LE staff mechanics used U.S. Government premises and equipment to perform after-hours auto repairs on personal vehicles owned by U.S. direct-hire employees. According to 28 C.F.R. § 45.4(a), employees may use U.S. Government property only for official business or as authorized by the Government. Embassy management told OIG that there were locally available auto-repair facilities. It is an inappropriate use of Government resources for LE staff mechanics to repair personally owned vehicles for U.S. direct-hire staff in this manner. This practice also creates an unsanctioned employment liability.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Djibouti should prohibit locally employed staff mechanics from repairing personally owned vehicles on U.S. Government property or with U.S. Government equipment. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Housing Program Was Not in Full Compliance with Department Standards

Embassy Djibouti's housing program did not fully meet Department standards. OIG found that housing files lacked documented security and safety surveys by the Regional Security Officer and Post Occupational Safety and Health Officer, as required in 15 FAM 252.5(a) and (c). In addition, from January through October 2017, the embassy housed 12 of 19 newly arrived employees in temporary quarters upon arrival because their permanent residences were not ready for occupancy. Although the embassy used vacant government-leased quarters for many of these employees, others stayed in hotels at considerable cost to the U.S. Government or to the employees in situations where the temporary quarters allowance did not cover all costs. This practice is generally inconsistent with 15 FAM 234, which states that, to the extent possible, the Interagency Housing Board should assign all new employees to appropriate housing prior to their arrival at post.

In addition, OIG found that Interagency Housing Board minutes were unclear and the board was chaired by an employee who reported to the Management Officer. Neither of these practices comply with Department standards. Guidance in 15 FAM 212.3 requires the embassy's Interagency Housing Board to maintain written records of its meetings; the absence of clear, understandable minutes is inconsistent with this provision. In addition, because of the risk of a conflict of interest, 15 FAM 212.2-2(B)(d) specifically prohibits an employee under the direct supervision of an embassy's management officer or general services officer from representing the Department on the housing board. OIG also noted that Embassy Djibouti's eligible family member housing coordinator position had been vacant for more than a year and at the time of the inspection, the position could not be filled due to the hiring freeze. The absence of a housing coordinator added to embassy's difficulties in managing the housing program.

All of these issues create vulnerabilities in the housing program. In addition to increasing the risk of safety or security vulnerabilities in embassy housing, they also diminish transparency, consistency, and fairness in housing decisions. Moreover, as noted above, some of these concerns increase financial costs to agencies and employees.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Djibouti should implement a housing program that is fully compliant with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Human Resources

Locally Employee Position Descriptions Were Not Current

Embassy Djibouti identified more than 80 outdated LE staff position descriptions that it planned to reclassify. However, OIG found additional position descriptions that required review. These included drivers whose shift work was not reflected in their position descriptions and a Facility Management supply clerk who was inappropriately assigned conflicting procurement and receiving responsibilities.

According to 3 FAH-2 H-443.1, the Human Resources Officer is responsible for requesting amendments to position descriptions if existing descriptions are inaccurate and for conducting an annual review of all positions. Here, inattention by the Human Resources Office contributed to the lack of annual reviews. These issues should be resolved, as an outdated and incorrect position description could prevent the proper classification of an LE staff position, which is used to determine the employee's compensation level.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with Bureau of African Affairs, should implement a comprehensive program for updating locally employed staff position descriptions in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with AF)

Locally Employed Staff Handbook Was Outdated and Had Not Been Translated

The embassy last issued its Locally Employed Staff Handbook in 2001 and had not updated it to reflect changes in LE position classification and post recruitment and separation policies. In addition, the embassy had not translated the handbook into any local language. Guidance in 3 FAH-2 H-132.4a requires that the human resources officer, who administers the mission's local compensation plan, provide explanations of the salary structure and benefits to supervisors and local employees. This generally is done in the Locally Employed Staff Handbook. In addition, 3 FAH-2 H-126.7 requires that if any employee has difficulty in reading and comprehending English, all written communication should be translated into the host country language. Without accurate policies and procedures, LE staff may not receive benefits to which they are entitled, and they may not fully understand relevant workplace policies.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should update and translate into relevant language(s) its Locally Employed Staff Handbook. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with DGHR)

Embassy Did Not Enforce Compliance with Department Standards for Vehicle Third Party Liability Insurance

Embassy Djibouti tracked U.S. direct-hire employees' purchase of third-party liability insurance for their personally owned vehicles but did not enforce Department requirements to maintain continuous and adequate coverage. In particular, guidance in 3 FAM 4124a and b require that employees obtain adequate personal liability insurance for their vehicles, maintain that insurance for the duration of their tour, and ensure that the coverage provides adequate compensation to victims under host country law. Failure to do so creates unnecessary risk for the U.S. Government.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Djibouti should implement a comprehensive policy outlining the requirements for vehicle third party liability coverage in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Retail Price Survey, Consumables Allowance Data for Embassy Djibouti Was Outdated

Embassy Djibouti had not submitted a current retail price survey report or a consumables survey as required every two years by 14 FAM 613.6-2.¹⁴ Human Resource Office employees were unaware that these surveys were overdue. Failure to submit these surveys on time could result in U.S. direct-hire staff receiving insufficient or excessive allowances.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should submit updated post consumables and retail price surveys. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with A)

Financial Management

Supervisors Did Not Conduct Subcashier Quarterly Unannounced Cash Verifications

Embassy Djibouti did not conduct quarterly unannounced cash verifications of subcashiers as required by 4 FAH-3 H-397.2-3, and, in fact, the subcashier supervisors were unaware of this requirement. Failure to conduct unannounced cash counts can lead to fraud or misuse of funds. Embassy Djibouti addressed the problem during the inspection and issued a management instruction stressing the importance of supervisor cash verifications as an internal control.

Embassy Inappropriately Billed Telephone Charges

Embassy Djibouti did not charge appropriately for residential phone lines or for official and personal telephone calls made from the embassy. Rather than charging phone expenses to users, the embassy instead charged all phone expenses to the International Cooperative

¹⁴ OIG's recent report (*Audit of Select Cost-of-Living Allowances for American Employees Stationed in Foreign Areas* (AUD-FM-17-51, August 2017)) recommended eliminating the location-specific survey data process for individual posts. Notwithstanding this recommendation, since the current process is still in place, the Department should ensure that it is followed correctly, which is why OIG is making a specific recommendation to address the problem at Embassy Djibouti.

Administrative Support Services (ICASS) allotment. OIG found that approximately two-thirds of the phone lines in the embassy (\$27,634 in FY 2017) were used by non-ICASS staff. Separately, the embassy charged all employees' residential telephone lines to ICASS (\$4,000 in FY 2017) instead of requiring employees to pay for this service.

These practices are inconsistent with Department standards. Guidance in 6 FAH-5 H-341.9-3(B), notes 3 and 8, requires that agencies be directly charged for calls when possible. And, according to 3 FAM 3255.4, the U.S. Government can pay for residential telephone and internet service only if required for official use, which was not the case at Embassy Djibouti. Failure to appropriately charge agencies and employees for telephone calls results in a misuse of government resources.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Djibouti should charge agencies and personnel appropriately for official and personal phone calls. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Embassy Did Not Use Electronic Funds Transfers for Local Employee Reimbursements

The embassy reimbursed LE staff in cash for medical and taxi invoices that exceeded \$25, rather than using electronic funds transfers, as required. For example, in September 2017, the embassy cashier processed 150 taxi and 53 medical reimbursements. Embassy officials told OIG that LE staff preferred to be reimbursed in cash, as they believed it would be faster than through an electronic funds transfer. Guidance in 4-FAH-3 H-391.1a and c(1), however, requires that all payments exceeding \$25 be made via check or electronic funds transfer. Failure to use electronic funds transfers for these payments requires the cashier to have more cash on hand, which contributes to internal control vulnerabilities.

Recommendation 19: Embassy Djibouti should use electronic funds transfer for taxi and medical reimbursements over \$25 to local employees. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Facility Management

Embassy Earthquake Preparedness Was Lacking

The Office of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) rates Djibouti as Zone 4 for seismic risk, the highest level. Embassy Djibouti, however, had not addressed findings from OBO's 2014 Seismic Report, nor had it performed seismic safety assessments of any subsequently leased residential properties. OIG also found no evidence that the General Services' housing office had received a copy of the 2014 OBO report, and residences listed as "poor" in the report remained in the housing pool. Guidance in 15 FAM 252.6f(3) requires posts in high-seismic areas, such as Djibouti, to perform seismic assessments using a structural engineer approved by OBO. Leasing properties without performing such assessments poses significant life safety risk to occupants.

Recommendation 20: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti, should implement a plan to evaluate all residences in the embassy housing pool for seismic risks and take action to address the deficiencies. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti)

Embassy's Preventive Maintenance Program Was Insufficient

The embassy did not have a comprehensive preventive maintenance program that encompassed its heating, ventilation, and air conditioning; building automation; and fire-suppression systems. Maintenance staff performed some preventive work in-house but were unqualified to ensure that a comprehensive maintenance program was in place. Guidance in 15 FAM 613b, however, requires each mission to establish and implement just such a comprehensive preventive, routine, and special maintenance program covering all facilities and major support systems. Failure to have sufficient preventive maintenance contracts may result in poorly planned and inefficient maintenance of key building systems. It also increases the risk of systems failure, which could leave the embassy vulnerable to disruptions in operations, requiring additional financial resources to address.

Recommendation 21: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should train its local staff in preventive maintenance or establish appropriate preventive maintenance contracts. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with OBO)

Flammable Materials Were Not Stored in Accordance with Department Standards

OIG found that, due to a lack of proper storage facilities, the embassy stored flammable materials in the warehouse near other supplies and equipment. Doing so violates Department standards found in 14 FAH-1 H 313.1-2(e). This provision stipulates that, if flammable material is stored in a warehouse, it should be in a fire-resistant enclosure, separated from other supplies by full height firewalls, with openings equipped with approved fire doors. The embassy told OIG it was working with OBO to purchase and build a controlled multi-bay storage facility for combustible and flammable materials but had yet to secure final approval. It is important to address this issue promptly, as improper separation and storage of flammable and combustible materials poses a fire and life-safety hazard.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should establish and implement a plan to appropriately store flammable materials. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with OBO)

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

OIG reviewed classified, unclassified, and dedicated internet network operations; physical protection of information technology assets; classified communication security; emergency communication preparedness; radio and telephone programs; and mail and pouch services. OIG found that most information management (IM) programs and services met customer needs and complied with Department requirements outlined in 5 FAM 120. OIG found deficiencies in the implementation of effective information security procedures and contingency planning, as discussed below. The companion classified report discusses one information security issue.

Information Systems Security Officer Improperly Designated

The Information Management Officer, who serves as the unclassified network administrator, also is designated as the network's Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO). Guidance in 12 FAH-10 H-352.1-1(2), however, specifically states that a network administrator cannot be both the ISSO and manager for the same information system. OIG advised that the ISSO duties for the unclassified network be reassigned to the IM specialist who administers the classified network and that the specialist be provided appropriate training. The current ISSO designation is an inherent conflict of interest that limits the effectiveness of the mission's network security.

Recommendation 23: Embassy Djibouti should reassign Information System Security Officer responsibilities to comply with the Department's separation of duties requirement. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Information Systems Security Officer Reviews Not Recorded

Embassy Djibouti's ISSO did not record information system audits or complete the Department's ISSO checklist, which should include weekly vulnerability scanning, monthly random email reviews, and monthly random user data reviews. The ISSO stated that this occurred because of competing priorities. Notwithstanding this explanation, guidance in 12 FAM 623.2 requires the Department to create, protect, and retain information system audit records. In addition, guidance in 12 FAH-10 H-122.5-2 requires the ISSO to conduct monthly reviews of randomly selected accounts to ensure users are not processing information above the authorized classification level for the computer system. Without regularly scheduled reviews and documented records, Department networks are vulnerable to potential unauthorized access and malicious activity. OIG issued a Management Assistance Report¹⁵ in May 2017 that identified the need to enforce the performance of information systems security officer duties by overseas information management personnel in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Djibouti should complete and record Information Systems Security Officer tasks as required by Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Information Technology Contingency Plans Were Untested

Embassy Djibouti had not tested the 2017 Information Technology Contingency Plan for the unclassified and classified computer networks, due to competing priorities. According to 5 FAM 851a, each information system must have a documented contingency plan that is tested annually. The January 2015 Bureau of Diplomatic Security Cyber Security Assessment and the September 2017 Regional Information System Security Officer Report also identified this deficiency. An untested Information Technology Contingency Plan increases the risk of ineffective responses to or loss of critical information during an emergency or crisis.

¹⁵ OIG, *Management Assistance Report: Non-Performance of Information Systems Security Officer Duties by Overseas Personnel* (ISP-17-24, May 2017).

Recommendation 25: Embassy Djibouti should conduct annual information technology contingency plan testing of the unclassified and classified networks in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

RECOMMENDATIONS

OIG provided a draft of this report to Department stakeholders for their review and comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued the following recommendations to the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, and Embassy Djibouti. The Department's complete responses can be found in Appendix B. The Department also provided technical comments that OIG incorporated, as appropriate, into this report.

Recommendation 1: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti, should restructure the staffing of the Political-Economic Section to more effectively support the embassy's Integrated Country Strategy goals (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, the Bureau of African Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the restructured Political-Economic Section.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs, should implement a social media strategy. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with AF and IIP)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the implemented social media strategy.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, should implement an annual resource development and programming plan for its American Space. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with IIP)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the annual resource development and programming plan for the American Space.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should prepare risk assessments and monitoring plans for all Public Affairs Section grants. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with A)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the risk assessments and monitoring plans for the grants.

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should reclassify the grade levels of the Consular Section chief position and one of the First- and Second-Tour consular officer positions in Embassy Djibouti. (Action: CA, in coordination with DGHR)

Management Response: In its April 2, 2018, response, the Bureau of Consular Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the reclassification of the grade levels for the consular positions.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should renovate the Consular Section to expand consular processing capabilities, improve management controls, and accommodate anticipated increased staffing. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with CA and OBO)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the renovated Consular Section.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration and the Bureau of African Affairs, should bring the embassy's property program into full compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with A and AF)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the embassy's property program in compliance with Department standards.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Djibouti should implement a comprehensive residential fuel delivery program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the comprehensive residential fuel delivery program that complies with Department standards.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Djibouti should comply with the Department's Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program policy on vehicle operator duty limits. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the embassy's vehicle operator duty limits.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Djibouti should update its update its vehicle policy to be compliant with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti).

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the updated vehicle policy.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Djibouti should require all mission drivers to comply with the Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of all mission drivers complying with the Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Djibouti should prohibit locally employed staff mechanics from repairing personally owned vehicles on U.S. Government property or with U.S. Government equipment. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the embassy prohibiting locally employed staff mechanics repairing personally owned vehicles on U.S. Government property or with U.S. Government equipment.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Djibouti should implement a housing program that is fully compliant with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the embassy housing program that complies with Department standards.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with Bureau of African Affairs, should implement a comprehensive program for updating locally employed staff position descriptions in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with AF)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the updated locally employed staff position descriptions.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should update and translate into relevant language(s) its Locally Employed Staff Handbook. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with DGHR)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the Locally Employed Staff Handbook translated into relevant language(s).

Recommendation 16: Embassy Djibouti should implement a comprehensive policy outlining the requirements for vehicle third party liability coverage in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the comprehensive policy outlining third party liability coverage.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should submit updated post consumables and retail price surveys. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in

coordination with A)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the updated post consumables and retail price surveys.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Djibouti should charge agencies and personnel appropriately for official and personal phone calls. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that agencies and personnel are appropriately charged for official and personal phone calls.

Recommendation 19: Embassy Djibouti should use electronic funds transfer for taxi and medical reimbursements over \$25 to local employees. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the use of electronic funds transfer for taxi and medical reimbursements to local employees.

Recommendation 20: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti, should implement a plan to evaluate all residences in the embassy housing pool for seismic risks and take action to address the deficiencies. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 3, 2018, response, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the plan to evaluate the embassy housing pool for seismic risks and address the deficiencies.

Recommendation 21: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should train its local staff in preventive maintenance or establish appropriate preventive maintenance contracts. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with OBO)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of preventive maintenance training or contracts.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should establish and implement a plan to appropriately store flammable materials. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with OBO)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the plan to appropriately store flammable materials.

Recommendation 23: Embassy Djibouti should reassign Information System Security Officer responsibilities to comply with the Department's separation of duties requirement. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of reassignment of the Information System Security Officer responsibilities.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Djibouti should complete and record Information Systems Security Officer tasks as required by Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the recorded Information System Security Officer tasks.

Recommendation 25: Embassy Djibouti should conduct annual information technology contingency plan testing of the unclassified and classified networks in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: In its April 11, 2018, response, Embassy Djibouti concurred with this recommendation.

OIG's Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the annual testing of the information technology contingency plan testing for the classified and unclassified networks.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Title	Name	Arrival Date
Chiefs of Mission:		
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.	Alexander Hamilton	5/2017
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission	Barbara Keary	8/2017
Chiefs of Sections:		
Management	Barbara Keary	8/2017
Consular	Brian Sells	9/2015
Political	Hermes Grullon	5/2016
Economic	Merry Walker	9/2017
Public Affairs	Jessica Banuls	9/2016
Regional Security	Gregory Mitchell	8/2017
Other Agencies:		
Defense Attaché	John Tully	8/2015
Office of Security Cooperation	Trish Basile	8/2017
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Daniel Choldin (Regional)	1/2017
U.S. Agency for International Development	Rabiha Mateen	8/2016

Source: Embassy Djibouti

APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This inspection was conducted from September 5, 2017, through January 11, 2018, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Objectives and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

Methodology

In conducting inspections, OIG uses a risk-based approach to prepare for each inspection; reviews pertinent records, circulates, and compiles the results of survey instruments, as appropriate; conducts interviews with Department and on-site personnel; observes daily operations; and reviews the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, and organizations affected by the review. OIG uses professional judgment, along with physical, documentary, testimonial, and analytical evidence collected or generated, to develop findings, conclusions, and actionable recommendations. For this inspection, OIG conducted approximately 117 interviews and reviewed 124 questionnaires.

APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSES

April 11, 2018

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THRU: Bureau of African Affairs – Donald Yamamoto, Senior Bureau Official;
Bureau of Consular Affairs – Carl Risch, Assistant Secretary;
Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations – William Moser, Acting Director

TO: OIG – Sandra Lewis, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

FROM: Embassy Djibouti – Larry E. André, Jr., Ambassador

SUBJECT: Response to Draft OIG Report – Inspection of Embassy Djibouti

Embassy Djibouti has reviewed the draft OIG Inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by OIG:

OIG Recommendation 1: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti, should restructure the staffing of the Political-Economic Section to more effectively support the embassy's Integrated Country Strategy goals (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti).

Management Response: The Bureau of African Affairs concurs with the recommendation and will work with Embassy Djibouti to pursue resources which will allow restructuring of the Political-Economic section to support the embassy's ICS goals more effectively.

OIG Recommendation 2: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs, should implement a social media strategy. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with AF and IIP)

Management Response: RESOLVED: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs, completed and implemented a Social Media Strategy in April 2018.

OIG Recommendation 3: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, should implement an annual resource development and programming plan for its American Space. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with IIP)

Management Response: RESOLVED: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and completed and, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, implemented an annual resource development and programming plan for our American Spaces in April 2018.

OIG Recommendation 4: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should prepare risk assessments and monitoring plans for all Public Affairs Section grants. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with A)

Management Response: RESOLVED: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and implemented a standard operating procedure in October 2017, requiring all new Public Affairs Section grants to include a risk assessment and monitoring plan.

OIG Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should reclassify the grade levels of the Consular Section chief position and one of the First- and Second-Tour consular officer positions in Embassy Djibouti. (Action: CA, in coordination with DGHR)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 6: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should renovate the Consular Section to expand consular processing capabilities, improve management controls, and accommodate anticipated increased staffing. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with CA and OBO)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation. Embassy Djibouti is currently coordinating with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to renovate the Consular Section to expand consular processing capabilities, improve management controls, and accommodate anticipated increased staffing.

OIG Recommendation 7: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration and the Bureau of African Affairs, should implement a program to bring the embassy's property program into full compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with A and AF)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration and the Bureau of African Affairs, is implementing a program to bring the embassy's property program into full compliance with Department standards.

OIG Recommendation 8: Embassy Djibouti should implement a comprehensive residential fuel delivery program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and is implementing a comprehensive residential fuel delivery program that complies with Department standards.

OIG Recommendation 9: Embassy Djibouti should comply with the Department's Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program policy on vehicle operator duty limits. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and is developing a program to ensure compliance with the Department's Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program policy on vehicle operator duty limits.

OIG Recommendation 10: Embassy Djibouti should update its vehicle policy to be compliant with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti).

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and is updating its vehicle policy to be compliant with Department standards.

OIG Recommendation 11: Embassy Djibouti should require all mission drivers to comply with the Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program. (Action: Embassy Djibouti).

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and is implementing a program to ensure all mission drivers comply with the Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program.

OIG Recommendation 12: Embassy Djibouti should prohibit locally employed staff mechanics from repairing personally owned vehicles on U.S. Government property or with U.S. Government equipment. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: RESOLVED: Embassy Djibouti now prohibits locally employed staff mechanics from repairing personally owned vehicles on U.S. Government property or with U.S. Government equipment.

OIG Recommendation 13: Embassy Djibouti should implement a housing program that is fully compliant with Department Standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and is implementing a housing program that is fully compliant with Department Standards.

OIG Recommendation 14: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with Bureau of African Affairs, should implement a comprehensive program for updating local staff position descriptions in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with AF).

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation. In coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, Embassy Djibouti is developing a comprehensive program for updating local staff position descriptions in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with AF)

OIG Recommendation 15: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should update and translate into relevant language(s) its Locally Employed Staff Handbook. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with DGHR)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation. In coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, the Embassy is working to update and translate into relevant language(s) its Locally Employed Staff Handbook.

OIG Recommendation 16: Embassy Djibouti should implement a comprehensive policy outlining the requirements for vehicle third party liability coverage in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: RESOLVED: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and has implemented a comprehensive policy outlining the requirements for vehicle third party liability coverage in accordance with Department standards.

OIG Recommendation 17: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should submit updated post consumables and retail price surveys. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with A)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation. In coordination with the Bureau of Administration, Embassy Djibouti is currently contracting to update and submit post consumables and retail price surveys.

OIG Recommendation 18: Embassy Djibouti should charge agencies and personnel appropriately for official and personal phone calls. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and is currently installing new software to be able to track and charge agencies and personnel for official and personal phone calls appropriately.

OIG Recommendation 19: Embassy Djibouti should use electronic funds transfer for taxi and medical reimbursements over \$25 to local employees. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: RESOLVED: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and has required the use of electronic funds transfer for taxi and medical reimbursements over \$25 to local employees.

OIG Recommendation 20: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti, should implement a plan to evaluate all residences in the embassy housing pool for seismic risks and take action to address the deficiencies. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti).

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and is working with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to develop a plan to evaluate all residences in the embassy housing pool for seismic risks and take action to address the deficiencies.

OIG Recommendation 21: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should train its local staff in preventive maintenance or establish appropriate preventive maintenance contracts. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with OBO)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation. In coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, the Embassy has begun training its local

staff in preventive maintenance. The Embassy is also researching possibilities to establish appropriate preventive maintenance contracts.

OIG Recommendation 22: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should establish and implement a plan to appropriately store flammable materials. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with OBO)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation. In coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Embassy Djibouti has established and begun implementing a plan to ensure that flammable materials are stored appropriately.

OIG Recommendation 23: Embassy Djibouti should reassign Information System Security Officer responsibilities to comply with the Department's separation of duties requirement. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: RESOLVED: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and has reassigned Information System Security Officer responsibilities in compliance with the Department's separation of duties requirement.

OIG Recommendation 24: Embassy Djibouti should complete and record Information Systems Security Officer tasks as required by Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: RESOVLED: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and now completes and records Information Systems Security Officer tasks as required by Department standards.

OIG Recommendation 25: Embassy Djibouti should conduct annual information technology contingency plan testing of the unclassified and classified networks in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Management Response: Embassy Djibouti concurs with the recommendation and will conduct annual information technology contingency plan testing of the unclassified and classified networks in accordance with Department standards.

The point of contact for this memorandum is Deputy Chief of Mission J. Alexander Hamilton.



United States Department of State

*Bureau of Consular Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520*

April 2, 2018

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: OIG – Sandra Lewis, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

FROM: Bureau of Consular Affairs – Carl Risch, Assistant Secretary

SUBJECT: Response to Draft OIG Report – Inspection of Embassy Djibouti

CA has reviewed the draft OIG Inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by OIG:

OIG Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should reclassify the grade levels of the Consular Section chief position and one of the First- and Second-Tour consular officer positions in Embassy Djibouti. (Action: CA, in coordination with DGHR)

Management Response: CA agrees with the recommendation. According to HR/RMA: “HR will work with CA in the coming days to review the classification of the affected positions and take action to reclassify the positions if warranted.”

The point of contact for this memorandum is Michael Mussi, CA/EX/PAS.

Approved: Carl C. Risch (CCR)

Drafted: CA/EX/PAS: Scott Driskel – ext. 5-7375

Cleared: CA: KChristensen (ok)
CA: JEchard (ok)
CA/EX: MMcEvoy, Acting (ok)
CA/EX/PAS: STsiros (ok)
CA/EX/PAS: MMussi (ok)

CA Tracking Number: T0797-18



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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APR - 3 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDRA LEWIS – OIG/ISP

FROM: OBO/RM – Jürg Hochuli 
SUBJECT: Inspection of Embassy Djibouti
Draft Report No. ISP-I-18-14, March 2018

OBO has attached a response to Recommendation 20 of the subject report. OBO response is in bold text.

Attachment:

As stated.

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**Inspection of Embassy Djibouti
Draft Report No. ISP-I-18-14, March 2018**

Recommendation 20: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti, should implement a plan to evaluate all residences in the embassy housing pool for seismic risks and take action to address the deficiencies. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Djibouti).

OBO Response, March 2018: OBO Natural Hazards Office will continue to assist Post in their efforts to transition to more seismic resistant housing. Djibouti is specifically challenged in terms of available structural engineers experienced in seismic design. Addressing and reducing seismic risk is a long-term process and OBO recognizes that seismic considerations are an important element of acquisition and lease renewal/new lease activities. Post should continue to follow the guidance provided in the OBO Residential Seismic Survey Report of March 4, 2014 and OBO's Natural Hazards Program SharePoint page referenced in the preface of the report for further residential lease guidance.

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APPENDIX C: FY 2016 STAFFING AND FUNDING BY AGENCY

Agency	U.S. Direct-hire Staff	U.S. Locally Employed Staff	Foreign National Staff	Total Staff ^a	Funding (\$)
Department of State					
Diplomatic & Consular Programs	17	2	16	35 ^b	1,992,300
Consular					645,025
ICASS	6	4	332	342	14,918,425
Public Diplomacy	1	0	5	6	198,900
Diplomatic Security	4	2	0	6	759,149
Marine Security	8	0	3	11	155,000
Representation	0	0	0	0	19,150
Overseas Buildings Operations	0	0	0	0	1,433,611
Subtotal	36	8	356	400	20,121,560
Department of Defense					
Defense Attaché Office	6	0	0	6	293,092
Office of Security Cooperation	6	0	3	9	118,863
Naval Criminal Investigative Service	1	0	0	1	105,048
Subtotal	13	0	3	16	517,003
Department of Justice					
Bureau of Conflict & Stabilization Operation	0	0	0	0	375,000
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	375,000
USAID	2	0	12	14	4,609,900
Subtotal	2	0	12	14	4,609,900
Total	51	8	371	430	25,623,463

Source: Generated by OIG from data provided by the Department.

ABBREVIATIONS

ARSO-I	Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator
CDA	Charge d'Affaires
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
FAST	First- and Second-Tour
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
IM	Information Management
ISSO	Information Systems Security Officer
LE	Locally Employed
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
PAS	Public Affairs Section
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

OIG INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS

James Derham, Team Leader

Jeannine Juhnke, Deputy Team Leader

Eric Chavera

Darren Felsburg

Thomas Furey

Sarah Hall

Robert Hartung

Paul Houge

Sherrie Marafino

Eleanor Nagy

Randy Smith

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